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CONSUMPTION AND SAVINGS BEHAVIOUR 















Since the GFC, mortgage debt and housing dynamics have been extensively 
researched. This issue is of central importance in understanding and analyzing 
individual consumption and savings behavior because housing takes up a large share in 
household illiquid assets, and most houses are financed with a mortgage loan.  
To realistically capture the evolution of mortgage debt in the household income 
and wealth distribution, it is necessary to take into account the issue of heterogeneity. 
Households differ in levels of wealth and equity, and thus differ in their decisions to 
consume and save. The implications of this type of heterogeneity has been proven to 
have effects on aggregate consumption and output.  
In this paper, I propose a model that incorporates i) heterogeneous households, 
ii) idiosyncratic labor income risk, and iii) incomplete markets. The model is set in a 
NK framework, enabling general equilibrium analysis. Furthermore, I utilize the finite 
difference method as an efficient method for solving for the general equilibrium. Some 
preliminary results indicate that under this setting, household consumption smoothing 
and precautionary savings motives still persist, and that the wealthy hand-to-mouth 

















The most recent Global Financial Crisis – also referred to as “the Great Recession” – has 
entailed some valuable lessons and insight for experts around the world. For years leading up 
to the Recession, the US housing market was experiencing a huge lending boom, which led to 
banks extending sub-prime mortgage loans in increasing amounts. The wake of the crisis was 
triggered by the burst of this housing bubble, where housing prices declined sharply, and 
homeowners found themselves suddenly facing negative equity.  
 
Not surprisingly, in the years that followed the Great Recession, the issue of a mortgage lending 
boom and its subsequent effects on the overall economy became a topic vigorously discussed 
and studied by experts and policymakers around the world. While methods have varied across 
the board, there is little disagreement in the literature about the fact that housing takes up a 
large portion of household wealth, and its presence plays a vital role in the consumption and 
savings behavior of households. In other words, a person who has chosen to buy a house instead 
of renting will most certainly differ in consumption priorities, sensitivity, and reaction to 
shocks from someone who is abundant in cash and demand deposits. Thus, by taking into 
account this sort of asset allocation (from liquid to illiquid) in the household asset portfolio 
when setting up the household problem enables us to derive a more realistic representation of 
household consumption behavior.  
 
Since the development of the real business cycle theory, the use of representative agent general 
equilibrium models with a New Keynesian framework have been the workhorse models used 
for macroeconomic analysis by policymakers. However, the recent crisis has also brought to 
light the fact that these models are becoming increasingly obsolete. Since then, much criticism 
has been directed towards the misgivings about models such as the Dynamic Stochastic 
General Equilibrium (DSGE) model, whose biggest downfall is perhaps the somewhat crude 
assumption of the existence of a representative agent in a given economy.  
 
This assumption, while useful for computational analysis, diverges far from reality. It is 
difficult – if not impossible – to correctly identify and parametrize a model to fit a single 
household who can represent the whole economy, especially in a setting where income equality 
among households seems to be perpetually deteriorating. According to Inequality.org, the gap 
between the rich and the poor has been steadily and markedly widening for some 30 years now. 
A recent OECD report declared that the average Gini coefficient for household disposable 
income of its member countries had jumped from 0.315 in 2010 to 0.318 in 2014, which is a 
record high since the mid-1980’s. Additionally, there are many more such data to indicate that 
income inequality is markedly increasing among households in many nations across the world.  
 
It is mainly for these reasons that the development of recent literature has become focused on 
incorporating household heterogeneity into standard workhorse models. It has now become 
widely accepted that inequality and macroeconomics are closely correlated, and capturing 
idiosyncratic shocks and realistic wealth distributions will more than likely lead to a more 
realistic representation of consumption behavior and hence, improved policymaking. 
 
Housing makes up a majority of household’s wealth, and most houses are purchased with a 
mortgage loan, and this type of indebtedness renders the household’s equity illiquid. 
Furthermore, having different levels of mortgage debt adds another level of heterogeneity to 
the household income and wealth distribution, and thus, the rationale for incorporating 
mortgage debt in the presence of heterogeneity is justified. Taking these issues into 
consideration, I build a heterogeneous agent model with liquid wealth and mortgage debt. The 
model is characterized by: i) household heterogeneity in holdings of liquid assets and 
subsidized mortgage debt, ii) idiosyncratic labor income shocks, and iii) incomplete markets. 
 
To solve the model, I apply the upwind scheme finite difference method described in Achdou 
et al. (2017), and find that consumption smoothing and precautionary savings motives still play 
a significant role in household’s behavior under the current setting. The rest of the paper is 
organized as follows: Section 3 proposes the model, and solves the problems of each agent 
individually. Section 4 defines the equilibrium and aggregates the model economy. In Section 
5, I utilize the finite difference method to find the steady state approximation, and linearize the 
equilibrium conditions. Section 6 introduces some preliminary results describing the household 
consumption and savings behavior, and Section 7 concludes with a discussion. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The notion of heterogeneity is not a new concept in economic analysis, and has been 
developing since the introduction of Bewley (1986), Huggett (1993), and Aiyagari (1994) 
models. Since then, these models have become the standard workhorse models for conducting 
macroeconomic analysis in the presence of heterogeneity. The majority of heterogeneous agent 
models today are based upon the assumptions posed in these models: i) a continuum of ex ante 
heterogeneous agents with uninsured idiosyncratic income risks, and ii) an incomplete market 
characterized by the presence of borrowing constraints. These assumptions abstract from the 
Arrow Debreu representative agent economies, and argue that when they hold, the individual 
consumption and savings behavior varies significantly from that of complete market models.  
 
On the other hand, Krussel and Smith (1998) have found that individual idiosyncratic shocks 
have an insignificant effect on the aggregate macroeconomic behavior, which can be fully 
characterized using only the mean of the wealth distribution. The model has later been revisited 
by Ahn et al. (2017), who applied a different approach to the computation of the model, and 
determined that income and wealth distribution do indeed affect the aggregate macroeconomic 
and welfare analysis.  
 
Computational advances have made it possible to solve a wide array of heterogeneous agent 
models. The finite difference method upwind scheme (Barles and Souganidis, 1991) proposes 
a sophisticated and efficient method of solving heterogeneous agent models in continuous time 
(Achdou et al., 2017). Kaplan et al., (2016) utilize this method to build an extension of a 
standard workhorse heterogeneous agent model in a New Keynesian framework, and find that 
the presence of idiosyncratic shocks and a multiple-asset structure lead to significantly different 
responses to shocks in household behavior compared to the traditional representative model. 
In the Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian (HANK) model setup, households’ direct 
response to a one-time monetary shock is much less pronounced, and most of effects of the 
shock are transmitted through indirect channels.  
 
Although a large amount of research has been conducted on the effects of mortgage debt on 
household’s behavior, so far, most of them apply empirical methods, VAR analysis, or use a 
framework of representative agent models. Punzi et al. (2017) build a discrete-time TANK 
model to analyze the effects of an increase in housing investment risk on spender-saver 
households, and derive the conclusion that deleveraging effects on aggregate variables are 
significant and more pronounced than that of representative agent models. Hedlund et al. 
(2016) study the role of mortgage debt on the monetary policy transmission channels in a 
discrete-time HANK setup, and find that a substantial drop in consumption due to a 
contractionary monetary policy can be attributed to a decline in housing prices, and that 
monetary policy is more effective in a high LTV economy.  
 
3. Heterogeneous Agent Model with Liquid Wealth and Mortgage Debt 
 
The model incorporates mortgage debt into the standard New Keynesian economy with 
heterogeneous agents as in Kaplan et al. The main motivation behind this modification is to 
quantitatively analyze the effects of mortgage debt on household optimal consumption and 
savings policies under a general equilibrium. Time is continuous.  
 
3.1 The Model Environment 
 
The model economy is one populated by a continuum of households, who differ in their 
holdings of liquid assets 𝑏, level of mortgage debt 𝑚, and their idiosyncratic labor productivity 𝑧. Each household’s lifetime spans infinity. On the production side, a final goods producer 
aggregates all goods produced by monopolistically competitive intermediate goods producers. 
Intermediate goods producers maximize their per-period profit, and are subject to price 
adjustment costs a la Rotemberg (1982). The introduction and role of financial intermediaries 
are inspired by Aoki and Nirei (2017). There is a large number of financial intermediaries who 
own the entire stock portfolio of all intermediary goods producers. These institutions 
internalize the risks of these illiquid assets, and sell riskless bonds to households in the form 
of liquid assets. The Government imposes a progressive tax on household labor income, and 
issues subsidized mortgage loans to households. There is a monetary authority who sets the 




In each period, households make a decision to maximize their discounted lifetime utility, which 
is composed of preferences over consumption of non-durables, housing services, and labor. 
Thus, the objective function for households is given by: 
 𝐸0 ∫ 𝑒−𝜌𝑡𝑢(𝑐𝑡 , ℎ𝑡 , 𝑙𝑡)𝑑𝑡∞0         (1) 
 
Households are subjected to inelastic labor supply, meaning that they are willing to work the 
same amount of hours for a given wage rate 𝑤𝑡 . Households receive utility flow from 
consumption and housing services, and disutility from hours worked. 𝜌 ≥ 0 is the discount rate 
for the future, and reflects the impatience of households.  
 
Labor income is taxed proportionally, and is simultaneously subject to an idiosyncratic shock 𝑧𝑡. The labor productivity shock 𝑧 follows a two-state Poisson process. Aside from taxing, the 
government also provides lump-sum transfers to households. 𝑟𝑡𝑏is the interest rate faced by 
households on their holdings of liquid wealth. I will define the flexible mortgage rate faced by 
households, 𝑟𝑡𝑚 , so that it is directly tied to the nominal interest rate and the current period 
inflation rate: 
 𝑟𝑡𝑚 ≡ 𝛽𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡         (2) 
 
Here, I also assume a linear relationship between the amount of housing services a household 
chooses and the mortgage debt amount 𝑚𝑡, and define 𝑚𝑡 ≡ 𝛾𝑚ℎ𝑡 . With this definition, it is 
implied that a household will have to take out a higher amount of payments if it wants to 
consume more housing services.  
 
Because the economy that is being considered is one in which financial markets are 
underdeveloped, households are not presented with the opportunity to own productive forms 
of illiquid assets such as company shares and stocks. Therefore, in each given period, they can 
borrow and invest in a riskless bond 𝑏𝑡, and buy housing services (consequently resulting in a 
change in mortgage debt). When buying a house, individuals take out long-term, adjustable 
rate mortgage loans, and enter into an agreement to make interest rate payments in the amount 
of 𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑡 from their current period income.  
 
In addition to interest rate payments, households must pay off the mortgage debt through time. 
In each period, they can choose the optimal amount of debt repayment, 𝑑𝑡, by making portfolio 
reallocation from liquid wealth to mortgage debt repayment. This transaction is subject to an 
adjustment cost, 𝜅(𝑑,𝑚). 
 
 
Households’ liquid assets and mortgage debt stock evolve as follows: 
 𝑏?̇? = 𝑤𝑡𝑙𝑡𝑧𝑡 − 𝑇?̃?(𝑤𝑡𝑧𝑡𝑙𝑡) + 𝑟𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑡 − 𝑑𝑡 − 𝜅(𝑑,𝑚) − 𝑐𝑡   (3) 𝑚𝑡̇ = −𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑡 − 𝑑𝑡        (4) 
 
where   𝑚 ≥ 0,          𝑏 ≥ 𝑏  
 
In addition to these, households face a borrowing constraint on the amount of debt payable 
each period. I pose an assumption that the mortgage lender imposes some kind of restriction 
on the debt burden of borrowers, and that the relationship is linear with the income of that 
household.  
 𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑡 ≤ 𝜙𝑤𝑡𝑙𝑡         (5) 
 
Households wealth and debt stock are also subject to the following transversality conditions 
designed for a no-Ponzi scheme requirement: 
 lim𝑡→∞ 𝑒−∫ 𝑟𝑠𝑏𝑑𝑠𝑡0 𝑏(𝑡) ≥ 0       (6) lim𝑡→∞ 𝑒−∫ 𝑟𝑠𝑚𝑑𝑠𝑡0 𝑚(𝑡) = 0       (7) 
 
Households maximize (1) subject to (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7) to solve for optimal decisions for 
consumption, housing services, and labor hours, while taking time paths for taxes, transfers, 
real wages, real return to liquid assets, and the mortgage rate as given (determined in 
equilibrium). The household’s problem is described recursively with a Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation alongside the Kolmogorov Forward Equation in 3.2.1 of this Section. 
 
3.1.2 Final Goods Producer 
 
There is a competitive representative final goods producer who uses the CES aggregator to 
aggregate goods produced by intermediate producers. Goods are indexed by 𝑗 ∈ [0,1]. 
 
𝑌𝑡 = (∫ 𝑦𝑗,𝑡𝜀−1𝜀 𝑑𝑗10 ) 𝜀𝜀−1        (8) 
 
3.1.3 Intermediate Goods Producers 
 
In this New Keynesian framework, intermediate producers operate on a monopolistically 
competitive market, and produce according to a constant returns to scale technology using 
effective units of capital 𝑘𝑗,𝑡 and effective units of labor 𝑛𝑗,𝑡.  
 𝑦𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑒𝑍𝑡𝑘𝑗,𝑡𝛼 𝑛𝑗,𝑡1−𝛼        (9) 
 
where 𝑍𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑍𝑡 is the logarithm of aggregate productivity. The log productivity 𝑍𝑡 follows 
an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process: 
 𝑑𝑍𝑡 = −𝜂𝑍𝑡𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑑𝑊𝑡       (10) 
 
This is analogous to the AR(1) process in discrete time, in which 𝑊𝑡 denotes a Wiener process 
that follows a standard Brownian motion, 𝜂 is the rate of mean reversion, and 𝜎 captures the 
standard deviation of said process. We solve for intermediate firms’ optimality conditions in 
Subsection 3.2.2. 
 
3.1.4 Financial Intermediaries 
 
In the model, I incorporate a large number of financial intermediaries with ownership of the 
entire stock portfolio of all intermediate goods producers. Their main objective is to convert 
risky stocks into risk-free bonds, which they then sell to households. This method of 
distributing monopoly profits of intermediate goods producers back to households was inspired 
by Aoki and Nirei (2017), and selected for the purpose of keeping the household asset portfolio 







The active role of the government in this model is characterized by its aim to balance its budget, 
which is where its total expenditures are equal to its revenues from taxation. In this model, for 
the sake of simplicity, I abstract from government spending, and instead, assume that it is in 
charge of providing mortgage loans in the form of subsidies. Therefore, it receives all interest, 
net debt repayments and the respective transaction costs as revenue. Total mortgage debt stock 
in the economy is financed by the government; therefore, the change in total mortgage debt 
stock is the government’s sole expenditure. Thus, the government balances its budget as below: 
 ?̇?𝑡 = ∫ ?̃?𝑡(𝑤𝑡𝑧𝑙𝑡)𝑑𝜇𝑡 + [𝐷𝑡 + 𝜅(𝐷,𝑀)] + 𝑟𝑚𝑀𝑡    (11) 
 
Here I define progressive tax: 𝑇?̃?(𝑦) ≡ −𝑇𝑡 + 𝜏𝑦, where 𝑇𝑡is lump-sum transfers and 𝜏 denotes 
a proportional tax levied on household labor income 𝑦.  
 
Due to heterogeneity in households, Ricardian equivalence breaks down. When a shock hits 
the economy, it can render an imbalance in the government’s budget. Since I assume the 
government does not borrow in the bonds market, and the mortgage debt supply and repayment 
are strictly determined by households’ decisions, it can rebalance its budget by adjusting the 
tax rate ?̃?𝑡 as necessary. 
 
3.1.6 Monetary Authority 
 
The central bank sets the nominal interest rate of the economy according to the Taylor rule: 
 𝑖𝑡 = ?̅? + 𝜙𝜋𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡𝑀𝑃        (12) 
 
where ?̅? is the natural interest rate defined exogenously. 𝑢𝑡𝑀𝑃 is a monetary policy shock with 
mean zero, and follows the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck diffusion process: 
 𝑑𝑙𝑛(𝑢𝑀𝑃) = −𝜂𝑢𝑢𝑀𝑃𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑢𝑑𝑋𝑡      (13) 
 
where 𝑑𝑋𝑡 is an innovation to the standard Brownian motion,  𝜂𝑢 is its mean reversion rate, 
and 𝜎𝑢 captures the size of the innovation. The real liquid interest rate, 𝑟𝑡𝑏, is derived from the 
Fischer equation as follows:  




In this Sub-section, I will solve the problems faced by agents in the economy separately for the 
purpose of deriving their optimal decision rules. Subsection 3.2.1 solves the households’ utility 
maximization problem using the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) and derives the joint 
distribution of wealth and mortgage debt using the Kolmogorov Forward Equation (KFE) or 
the Fokker-Planck equation. Subsection 3.2.2 solves the firms’ profit maximization problem 
for the optimality conditions along the line of a New Keynesian framework, and 3.2.3 presents 
the profit maximization problem for the financial intermediaries.  
 
3.2.1 Households’ Problem 
 
The households’ HJB equation is given as follows:  
 𝜌𝑉(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧) = max𝑐𝑡,ℎ𝑡,𝑙𝑡 𝑢(𝑐, ℎ, 𝑙) + 𝑉𝑏(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)(𝑤𝑡𝑧𝑡𝑙𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡 + 𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑡 − 𝑑𝑡 − 𝜅(𝑑,𝑚) − 𝑐 + 𝑉𝑚(−𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡 − 𝑑𝑡)+∑𝜆(𝑧1, 𝑧2){(𝑉(𝑏,𝑚 𝑧2) − 𝑉(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧1)} + 1𝑑𝑡 𝐸𝑡[𝑑𝑉(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)]  
           (15) 
To derive the optimal household decisions, we must analyze the first order conditions: 
 
1. FOC w.r.t 𝑐𝑡: 𝑢𝑐(𝑐, ℎ, 𝑙) = 𝑉𝑏(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)       (16) 
 
2. FOC w.r.t ℎ𝑡: 𝑢ℎ(𝑐, ℎ, 𝑡) = 𝛾ℎ𝑟𝑚𝑉𝑚(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)      (17) ∵ 𝑚 ≡ 𝛾ℎℎ𝑡 ⇒ ?̇? = −𝑟𝑚𝛾ℎℎ𝑡 − 𝑑𝑡  
 
3. FOC w.r.t 𝑙𝑡: 𝑢𝑙(𝑐, ℎ, 𝑙) = (−𝑤𝑧 + ?̃?)𝑉𝑏(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)      (18) 
 
4. FOC w.r.t 𝑑𝑡: [−1 − 𝜅𝑑(𝑑,𝑚)]𝑉𝑏(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧) = 𝑉𝑚(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)     (19) 
 
Before commencing any further with solving for optimal decisions corresponding to the 
household’s HJB, let us provide a couple of additional details on the model that are related to 
this part. 
 
A. CRRA utility function 
 
The model assumes that each household has time separable preferences and instantaneous 
utility over consumption, housing, and labor. For analytical simplicity, the utility function takes 
the functional form of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).  
 𝑢(𝑐, ℎ, 𝑙) = 11−𝛾 𝑐1−𝛾 + 11−𝜑 ℎ1−𝜑 − 11−𝜓 𝑙1−𝜓    (20) 
 
B. Adjustment Cost Function 
 
As mentioned previously, mortgage refinancing/repayment is carried out in a similar fashion 
to portfolio reallocation, in the sense that the payment is made out from liquid earnings. Thus, 
I adopt a similar adjustment cost function to that of Kaplan et al. (2016). This adjustment cost 
is a function of debt repayment/refinancing and mortgage debt stock, and takes the following 
form: 
 𝜅(𝑑,𝑚) = 𝜅0|𝑑| + 𝜅12 ( 𝑑max{𝑚,𝑚})2max{𝑚,𝑚} , 𝑚 > 0   (21) 
 
This functional form is assumed for the sake of having a linear part, which represents an 
inaction region, and a convex part that which ensures the finite nature of repayment/refinancing 
rate (|𝑑𝑡| < ∞).  
 
Now that the functional forms for the household’s preferences and the adjustment costs have 
been defined, we can derive the optimal decision rules for consumption, savings, housing, and 
mortgage repayment rate. To do so, we can utilize equations (16) - (19) derived from the HJB 
equation. 
 
1. Consumption: 𝑐−𝛾 = 𝑉𝑏(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)  ⇒  𝑐∗(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧) = 𝑉𝑏(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)−1𝛾      (22) 
2. Housing: ℎ−𝜑 = 𝛾ℎ𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑉𝑚(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)  ⇒  ℎ∗(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧) = [𝛾ℎ𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑉𝑚(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)]−1𝜑     (23) 
3. Labor: 




Given that:  
𝜅𝑑(𝑑,𝑚) = { 𝜅0 + 𝜅1 𝑑𝑚 ,        𝑑 > 0−𝜅0 + 𝜅1 𝑑𝑚 ,       𝑑 < 0 
Substituting into FOC and rearranging: 
𝜅1𝑚 𝑑 = {  
  −𝑉𝑚(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)𝑉𝑏(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧) − 1 − 𝜅0,    𝑑 > 0−𝑉𝑚(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)𝑉𝑏(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧) − 1 + 𝜅0,     𝑑 < 0 
 
⇒  𝑑∗ = {  
  (−𝑉𝑚(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)𝑉𝑏(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧) − 1 − 𝜅0) 𝑚𝜅1 ,      𝑑 > 0(−𝑉𝑚(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)𝑉𝑏(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧) − 1 + 𝜅0) 𝑚𝜅1 ,      𝑑 < 0 
In general form, we can rewrite the equation for optimal repayment as follows: 
𝑑∗ = (− 𝑉𝑚(𝑏,𝑚,𝑧)𝑉𝑏(𝑏,𝑚,𝑧) − 1 + 𝜅0)− 𝑚𝜅1 + (− 𝑉𝑚(𝑏,𝑚,𝑧)𝑉𝑏(𝑏,𝑚,𝑧) − 1 − 𝜅0)+ 𝑚𝜅1  (25) 
 
5. Liquid savings: 𝑠𝑏∗(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧) = 𝑤𝑡𝑧𝑙𝑡 − ?̃? + 𝑟𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑡 − 𝑑𝑡 − 𝜅0|𝑑| + 𝜅12 (𝑑𝑚)2𝑚 − 𝑐  (26) 
 
6. Mortgage debt build-up: 𝑠𝑚∗ (𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧) = −𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑡 − 𝑑𝑡       (27) 
 
The Kolmogorov Forward Equation (Fokker-Planck Equation) provides the joint distributions 
of households’ liquid assets (𝑏), debt (𝑚), and idiosyncratic labor productivity (𝑧). This 
distribution is essentially a density function, and is denoted as 𝑔(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧, 𝑡). Also, the optimal 
liquid asset savings policy function and the optimal mortgage debt build-up policy functions 
in (26) and (27) can be interpreted as the optimal drifts in the HJB equation.  
 𝑑𝑔𝑡(𝑏,𝑚,𝑧)𝑑𝑡 = −𝜕𝑏[𝑠𝑡𝑏(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)𝑔𝑡(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)] − 𝜕𝑚[𝑠𝑡𝑚(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)𝑔𝑡(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)] − 𝜆1𝑔𝑡(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧1) +      +𝜆2𝑔𝑡(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧2)        (28) 
 
The household’s consumption and savings policy functions are derived from the HJB equation, 
and the joint distribution of individual state variables 𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧 is described by the KFE. Solving 
these two equations will yield the solution to the household’s problem. In actuality, there is a 
numerical solution to the HJB equation, which is a “constrained viscosity solution”, and using 
the upwind finite difference method as in Achdou et al. (2017), the solution to the HJB 
essentially gives the solution to the KFE “for free”. A more detailed solution using the finite 




3.2.2 Final Goods Producer’s Problem 
 
The representative final goods producer aggregates 𝑗 types of intermediate goods according to 
(8). Here, the elasticity of substitution across goods is given by 𝜀 > 0. The profit maximization 
problem of the final producer is characterized as follows: 
 
max𝑦𝑗,𝑡 𝑃𝑡 (∫ 𝑦𝑗,𝑡 𝜀−1𝜀10 𝑑𝑗) 𝜀𝜀−1 − ∫ 𝑝𝑗,𝑡 𝑦𝑗,𝑡𝑑𝑗10      (29) 
 
Then, the FOCs for a typical intermediate good 𝑗 is as follows: 
𝑃𝑡 𝜀𝜀−1(∫ 𝑦𝑗,𝑡𝜀−1𝜀 𝑑𝑗10 ) 𝜖𝜀−1−1 𝜀−1𝜀 𝑦𝑗,𝑡𝜀−1𝜀 −1 = 𝑝𝑗,𝑡     (30) 
 
This can be written as: 
            (∫ 𝑦𝑗,𝑡𝜀−1𝜀 𝑑𝑗10 ) 1𝜀−1 𝑦𝑗,𝑡−1𝜀 = 𝑝𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑡              
or: 
(∫ 𝑦𝑗,𝑡𝜀−1𝜀 𝑑𝑗10 )− 𝜀𝜀−1 𝑦𝑗,𝑡−1𝜀 = (𝑝𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑡 )−𝜀      (31) 
 
Utilizing the definition of the aggregate final good, we derive the demand for intermediate 
good j:  𝑦𝑗,𝑡(𝑝𝑗,𝑡) = (𝑝𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑡 )−𝜀 𝑌𝑡,        (32) 
 
The downward sloping demand curve for intermediate good j in (32) implies that the relative 
demand for this good is a function of its relative price, and is proportional to aggregate output 𝑌𝑡. Here, 𝜀 is the price elasticity of demand.  
 
In order to derive a price index for the aggregate price level, we apply the definition of nominal 
output as the sum of prices multiplied by quantities.  
 
 𝑃𝑡𝑌𝑡 = ∫ 𝑝𝑗,𝑡𝑦𝑗,𝑡𝑑𝑗10    
Plugging in demand for j-th good derived in (32) into the above definition: 
 
 𝑃𝑡𝑌𝑡 = ∫ 𝑝𝑗,𝑡1−𝜀𝑃𝑡𝜀𝑌𝑡𝑑𝑗10   
 ⇒ 𝑃𝑡𝑌𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡𝜀𝑌𝑡 ∫ 𝑝𝑗,𝑡1−𝜀𝑑𝑗10   
 
Simplify above equation, we obtain the price index: 
 𝑃𝑡 = (∫ 𝑝𝑗,𝑡1−𝜀10 𝑑𝑗) 11−𝜀        (33) 
 
3.2.3 Intermediate Firm’s Problems 
 
The monopolistically competitive intermediate firms produce differentiated goods indexed   𝑗 = [0, 1] according to the production technology in (11), and subject to aggregate productivity 
shock in (12).  
 
Solving the cost minimization problem results in factor prices faced by an intermediate 
producer equaling their respective marginal revenue products, and the marginal costs are given 
as follows: 
 𝑚𝑐𝑡 = 1𝑒𝑍 (𝑟𝑡𝑘𝛼 )𝛼 ( 𝑤𝑡1−𝛼)1−𝛼       (34) 
 
Here, 𝑟𝑡𝑘 is the rate of rent of capital, and 𝑤𝑡 is real wages to hire the labor to produce 
intermediate goods. 
 
The model assumes that in equilibrium, there is no inflation, i.e., 
𝑝𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑡 = 1. Aggregate amount 
of labor and capital used by firms will be equal to the sum of all inputs used by all firms, and 
that factor prices are determined on a competitive market. In this case, we can simply derive 
factor prices as follows: 
 𝑟𝑡𝑘 = 𝛼𝑒𝑍𝐾𝛼−1𝑁1−𝛼 − 𝛿       (35) 𝑤𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)𝑒𝑍𝐾𝛼𝑁−𝛼       (36) 
 
Due to the monopolistically competitive nature of intermediate producers, each firm faces a 
downward sloping demand curve as in (32), which means that it has monopoly power to set its 
price. Intermediate firms choose their prices to maximize their respective profits, but face 
quadratic price adjustment costs a la Rotemberg: 
 Θ𝑡 (𝑝?̇?𝑝𝑡) = 𝜃2 (𝑝?̇?𝑝𝑡)2 𝑌𝑡 = 𝜃2 (𝜋)2𝑌𝑡      (37) 
 
Taking the price adjustment cost in (37) into account, the profit maximization problem of an 
intermediate goods producer is given by: 
 ∫ 𝑒−∫ 𝑟𝑠𝑏𝑑𝑠𝑡0 {Π𝑡(𝑝𝑡) − Θ𝑡 (𝑝?̇?𝑝𝑡)} 𝑑𝑡∞0       (38) 
 
where per-period profits are given by: 
 Π𝑡(𝑝𝑡) = (𝑝𝑡𝑃𝑡 −𝑚𝑐𝑡) (𝑝𝑡𝑃𝑡)−𝜀 𝑌𝑡      (39) 
 
Now, I will utilize the recursive form of the profit maximization problem of the intermediate 
firm to derive the Phillips Curve in this model. The treatment here largely follows that of 
Kaplan et al (2016). Here, I denote the real value of a firm with price 𝑝 as 𝑄(𝑝, 𝑡). 
 𝑟𝑡𝑏𝑄(𝑝, 𝑡) = max𝜋 (𝑝𝑃𝑡 −𝑚𝑐𝑡) (𝑝𝑃𝑡)−𝜀 𝑌𝑡 − 𝜃2 𝜋2𝑌𝑡 + 𝑄𝑝(𝑝, 𝑡)𝑝𝜋 + 𝑄𝑡(𝑝, 𝑡) (40) 
 
Then, the first order and envelope conditions are derived as follows: 
 𝑄𝑝(𝑝, 𝑡)𝑝 = 𝜃𝜋𝑌          (𝑟𝑏 − 𝜋)𝑄𝑝(𝑝, 𝑡) = −(𝑝𝑃 − 𝑚𝑐) 𝜀 (𝑝𝑃)−𝜀−1 𝑌𝑃 + (𝑝𝑃)−𝜀 𝑌𝑃 + 𝑄𝑝𝑝(𝑝, 𝑡)𝑝𝜋 + 𝑄𝑡𝑝(𝑝, 𝑡) 
 
Again, in equilibrium, it is assumed that 𝑝 = 𝑃. Therefore, the set of equations above will 
collapse to: 
 𝑄𝑝(𝑝, 𝑡) = 𝜃𝜋𝑌𝑝         (41) (𝑟𝑡𝑏 − 𝜋)𝑄𝑝(𝑝, 𝑡) = −(1 −𝑚𝑐)𝜀 𝑌𝑝 + 𝑌𝑝+ 𝑄𝑝𝑝(𝑝, 𝑡)𝑝𝜋 + 𝑄𝑡𝑝(𝑝, 𝑡)  (42) 
 
Differentiating (41) with respect to time will yield: 
 
  𝑄𝑝𝑝(𝑝, 𝑡)?̇? + 𝑄𝑝𝑡(𝑝, 𝑡) = 𝜃𝑌?̇?𝑝 + 𝜃?̇?𝜋𝑝 − 𝜃𝑌𝑝 ?̇?𝑝 
 
Plug this result into equation (42), and divide by 𝜃𝑌/𝑝 to derive: 
 
 (𝑟𝑏 − ?̇?𝑌) 𝜋 = 1𝜃 [−(1 − 𝑚𝑐)𝜀 + 1] + ?̇?  
 
Rearrange the variables to attain the New Keynesian Phillips curve in continuous time: 
 (𝑟𝑡𝑏 − ?̇?𝑡𝑌𝑡) 𝜋𝑡 = 𝜀𝜃 (𝑚𝑐𝑡 −𝑚𝑐∗) + 𝜋?̇?       (43) 
 
We can write the equation in (43) in present-value form: 
 𝜋𝑡 = 𝜀𝜃 ∫ 𝑒−∫ 𝑟𝜏𝑏𝑑𝜏𝑠𝑡 𝑌𝑠𝑌𝑡 (𝑚𝑐𝑠 −𝑚𝑐∗)𝑑𝑠∞𝑡      (44) 
 
Here, ℳ∗ = 1𝑚𝑐∗ = 𝜀𝜀−1 is the flexible price optimum markup, while ℳ𝑠 = 1𝑚𝑐𝑠 is a firm’s 
markup at time 𝑠. Intermediate firms will choose to increase their price if ℳ𝑠 <ℳ∗.  
 
3.2.4 Financial Intermediary’s Problem 
 
There is a large number of perfectly competitive, identical financial intermediaries whose sole 
purpose is to redistribute firms’ profits to households. For the purpose of simplicity, I assume 
that each firm’s net worth is equal to zero. In the process of redistributing firms’ profits, they 
receive revenue flow from their shares of intermediate firms, and incur costs from interest paid 
on risk-free, liquid bonds that they issue to households. An additional assumption here is that 
the financial intermediary also rents out physical capital to intermediate firms through a 
competitive rental market. Therefore, in equilibrium, the financial intermediaries’ income from 
ownership of firms is equal to intermediate producers’ profits: 
 𝑞𝑡𝐾𝑡 = (1 − 𝑚𝑐)𝑌        (45) 
 
where 𝑞𝑡 is dividend rate per unit of capital, and (1 − 𝑚)𝑌 is firms’ profits in given by equation 
(39) in the case of no inflation.  
 
Finally, the financial intermediaries earn income on capital rent, and pay interest on bonds 
issued. This, in simple form, their per-period profits are given as below: 
 Π𝑡𝑓𝑖 = 𝑞𝑡𝐾𝑡 + (𝑟𝑡𝑘 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑓      (46) 
 
Let us denote the net worth of a financial intermediary as 𝑊 = 𝐾 −𝐵𝑓. The equilibrium 
condition is that 𝑊 = 0, and hence 𝐾 = 𝐵𝑓. Therefore, we can substitute this condition into 
(46) to attain: 
 
 Π𝑡𝑓𝑖 = 𝑞𝑡𝐾𝑡 + (𝑟𝑡𝑘 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡𝐵𝐾𝑡           
 
Maximize profits by taking FOC w.r.t 𝐾𝑡 and equating to zero, we get: 
 𝑟𝑡𝑏 = 𝑞𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡𝑘 − 𝛿        (47) 
 
4 Equilibrium and Aggregation  
 
In this Section, we define and derive the aggregate equilibrium to close the model economy. 
 
4.1 Definition of Equilibrium 
 
An equilibrium in this economy is defined as price paths for prices {𝑤𝑡 , 𝑟𝑡𝑘 , 𝑟𝑡𝑏, 𝑟𝑡𝑚}, and 
corresponding allocations, and a government policy path for taxation {𝑇?̃?}, such that: 
(i) Households, intermediate goods producers, and financial intermediaries maximize 
their objective functions, taking as given equilibrium prices {𝑤𝑡 , 𝑟𝑡𝑘 , 𝑟𝑡𝑏 , 𝑟𝑡𝑚} and 
taxation policy {𝑇?̃?}, 
(ii) The government budget constraint holds, and 
(iii) All four markets clear as follows: 
 
a. The liquid asset market clears when total household saving in risk-free bonds 
equals bonds issued by the financial intermediaries: 𝐵𝑡ℎ = 𝐵𝑡𝑓 
 
b. The capital market clears when the total amount of capital used in production is 
in equilibrium with household saving in liquid assets issued through the 
financial intermediaries:  𝐾𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡𝑓 
 
c. The labor market clears when: 𝑁𝑡 = ∫𝑧𝑙𝑡(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)𝑑𝑏𝑑𝑚𝑑𝑧 
 




Given the definition of equilibrium in the previous Subsection, I will now make a summary of 
all aggregate variables of the economy in this state to ensure that the model is closed. We have 
26 variables {𝑟𝑏, 𝑟𝑚 , 𝑤, 𝑟𝑘 , Π,𝑚𝑐, 𝑌, 𝐾, 𝑞, 𝐵𝑓, 𝐵ℎ, 𝑖, 𝜋,𝑚𝑐∗, 𝐼, 𝐶, 𝜅, 𝐷,𝑀, ?̃?, ?̇?, 𝐻,𝑁, 𝑐, ℎ, 𝑙}, 
and the corresponding 26 equations to close the model. 
  𝑟𝑡𝑘 = 𝛼𝑒𝑍𝐾𝛼−1𝑁1−𝛼 − 𝛿  (48) 𝑤𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)𝑒𝑍𝐾𝛼𝑁−𝛼  (49) Π = (1 − 𝑚𝑐)𝑌  (50) 𝑚𝑐 = 1𝑒𝑍 (𝑟𝑘𝛼 )𝛼 ( 𝑤1−𝛼)1−𝛼  (51) 𝑌 = 𝑞𝐾1−𝑚𝑐  (52) 𝑞 = 𝑟𝑏 − (𝑟𝑘 − 𝛿)         (53) 𝑟𝑏 = 𝑖 − 𝜋         (54) 𝑖 = 𝜙𝜋 + ?̅?         (55) 𝜋 = 𝜀𝜃 ∫ 𝑒−∫ 𝑟𝜏𝑏𝑑𝜏𝑠𝑡 𝑌𝑠𝑌𝑡 (𝑚𝑐𝑠 −𝑚𝑐∗)𝑑𝑠∞𝑡      (56) 
𝑚𝑐∗ = 𝜀−1𝜀          (57) 𝐾 = 𝐵𝑓         (58) 𝐵𝑓 = 𝐵ℎ  (59) 𝐵ℎ = ∫ 𝑏𝑔1(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)𝑑𝑏𝑑𝑚𝑑𝑧 + ∫ 𝑏𝑔2(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)𝑑𝑏𝑑𝑚𝑑𝑧∞𝑏∞𝑏    (60) 𝑟𝑚 = 𝛽𝑖 − 𝜋         (61) 𝐼 = 𝑌 − 𝐶 − 𝜅(𝐷,𝑀)        (62) 𝐶 = ∫ 𝑐∗(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)𝑑𝑏𝑑𝑚𝑑𝑧       (63) 𝜅(𝐷,𝑀) = 𝜅0|𝐷| + 𝜅12 (𝐷𝑀)2𝑀      (64) 𝐷 = ∫𝑑∗ (𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)𝑑𝑏𝑑𝑚𝑑𝑧       (65) 𝑀 = ∫ 𝑚𝑔1(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧1)𝑑𝑏𝑑𝑚𝑑𝑧∞0 + ∫ 𝑚𝑔2(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧2)𝑑𝑏𝑑𝑚𝑑𝑧∞0   (66) ?̃? = ?̇? − 𝐷 − 𝜅(𝐷,𝑀) − 𝑟𝑚𝑀      (67) ?̇? = −𝑟𝑚𝑀−𝐷        (68) 𝐻 = ∫ℎ∗(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)𝑑𝑏𝑑𝑚𝑑𝑧       (69) 𝑁 = ∫𝑧𝑙∗(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)𝑑𝑏𝑑𝑚𝑑𝑧       (70) 
 𝑐∗(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧) = 𝑉𝑏(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)−1𝛾       (71) ℎ∗(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧) = [𝛾ℎ𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑉𝑚(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)]−1𝜑      (72) 𝑙∗ = [(−𝑤𝑧 + ?̃?)𝑉𝑏(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)]−1𝜓      (73) 
 
Equations (48) - (73) aggregate the model in equilibrium. However, although we can pin down 
all 26 variables, due to the rich heterogeneity in households’ states and behaviors in this 
economy, equations related to this block of the model cannot be solved analytically. Thus, I 
propose an alternative solution to this model in Section 5.  
 
 
5. Alternative Solution Method 
 
The alternative solution method I apply to this model is widely used in models with rich 
heterogeneity. The method involves using the finite difference method as in Achdou et al. 
(2017) to approximate variables, then discretizing and linearizing the model around the steady 
state to make it tractable. The finite difference method an efficient and robust method for 
solving heterogeneous agent models in continuous time, and was used by Kaplan et al. (2017) 
to solve the Krussel and Smith (1998) model. The treatment here closely follows that of Kaplan 
et al. (2017). The finite difference method applied to derive the approximations is explained in 
Appendix I of this paper. 
 
Before commencing any further, let me simplify the model for computational convenience. 
The simplifying assumptions essentially involve setting labor supply exogenously, and 
excluding the activities of the government and the central bank. Thus, an equilibrium of the 
model can now we simply characterized as follows: 
 𝜌𝑉(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧) = max𝑐 𝑢(𝑐𝑡) + 𝑉𝑏(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)(𝑤𝑡𝑧𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑡 − 𝑑𝑡 − 𝜅(𝑑,𝑚) − 𝑐𝑡) + 𝑉𝑚(−𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑡− 𝑑𝑡 +∑𝜆(𝑧1, 𝑧2)[𝑉(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧2) − 𝑉(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧1)] + 1𝑑𝑡 𝐸𝑡[𝑑𝑉(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)] 
          (74) 𝑑𝑔𝑡(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)𝑑𝑡 = −𝜕𝑏[𝑠𝑡𝑏(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)𝑔𝑡(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)] − 𝜕𝑚[𝑠𝑡𝑚(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)𝑔𝑡(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)] − 𝜆𝑔𝑡(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧1)+ 𝜆𝑔𝑡(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧2) 
           (75) 𝑑𝑍𝑡 = −𝜂𝑍𝑡𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑑𝑊𝑡       (76) 𝑤𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)𝑒𝑍𝑡𝐾𝑡𝛼𝑁−𝛼       (77) 𝑟𝑡𝑏 = 𝛼𝑒𝑍𝑡𝐾𝑡𝛼−1𝑁1−𝛼 − 𝛿       (78) 𝑟𝑡𝑚 = 𝛽𝑟𝑡𝑏         (79) 𝐾𝑡 = ∫𝑏𝑔𝑡(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)𝑑𝑏𝑑𝑚𝑑𝑧       (80) 𝑀𝑡 = ∫𝑚𝑔𝑡(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)𝑑𝑏𝑑𝑚𝑑𝑧      (81) 
 
where 𝑠𝑡𝑏(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧) = 𝑤𝑡𝑧 + 𝑟𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑡 − 𝑑𝑡 − 𝜅(𝑑,𝑚) − 𝑐𝑡 and 𝑠𝑡𝑚(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧) = −𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑡 − 𝑑𝑡 are 
the optimal savings and debt accumulation policies. 
 
The HJB and KFE equations in this part are identical to those described in the household’s 
problem in Subsection 3.2.1, with a minor modification of the exclusion of taxes and 
exogenous labor supply for simplicity. Note that these can all be added to the method applied 
here without loss of efficiency. 
 
Now that the model is simplified and closed, the next logical step is to define a steady state. 
The steady state in this case is defined as an equilibrium where aggregate productivity is 
constant at 𝑍𝑡 = 0, and the joint distribution of liquid wealth, mortgage debt and idiosyncratic 
shock 𝑔(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧) is time-invariant. Hence, the steady state can be defined by the following set 
of equations: 
 𝜌𝑉(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧) = max𝑐 𝑢(𝑐) + 𝑉𝑏(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)(𝑤𝑧 + 𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝑑 − 𝜅(𝑑,𝑚) − 𝑐) + 𝑉𝑚(−𝑟𝑚𝑚− 𝑑+∑𝜆(𝑧1, 𝑧2)[𝑉(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧2) − 𝑉(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧1)] ,    𝑚 < 𝑤𝑧 
          (82) 0 = −𝜕𝑏[𝑠𝑏(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)𝑔(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)] − 𝜕𝑚[𝑠𝑚(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)𝑔(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)] − 𝜆𝑔(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧1) + 𝜆𝑔(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧2) 
           (83) 𝑤 = (1 − 𝛼)𝐾𝛼𝑁−𝛼        (84) 𝑟𝑏 = 𝛼𝐾𝛼−1𝑁1−𝛼 − 𝛿       (85) 𝑟𝑚 = 𝛽𝑟𝑏         (86) 𝐾 = ∫ 𝑏𝑔(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)𝑑𝑏𝑑𝑚𝑑𝑧       (87) 𝑀 = ∫𝑚𝑔(𝑏,𝑚, 𝑧)𝑑𝑏𝑑𝑚𝑑𝑧       (88) 
 
Now that the steady state without aggregate shocks is defined, the next step is to approximate 
the steady state using a linearization procedure. The approximation method used here is the 
finite difference methods described in Achdou et al. (2017). The value function and distribution 
are approximated over discretized grids of liquid asset holdings 𝒃 = (𝑏1 = 0, 𝑏2, … , 𝑏𝐼)𝑇 and 
mortgage debt 𝒎 = (𝑚1 = 0,𝑚2, … ,𝑚𝐼)𝑇. The value function over these grids is denoted by:  
 𝒗 = (𝑣(𝑏1, 𝑚1, 𝑧1) … 𝑣(𝑏𝐼, 𝑚1, 𝑧2)𝑣(𝑏1, 𝑚1, 𝑧1) … 𝑣(𝑏1, 𝑚𝐼, 𝑧2))𝑇 
 
and the distribution over the grids is given by:   
 𝒈 = (𝑔(𝑏1, 𝑚1, 𝑧1) … 𝑔(𝑏𝐼 , 𝑚1, 𝑧2)𝑔(𝑏1, 𝑚1, 𝑧1) … 𝑔(𝑏1, 𝑚𝐼 , 𝑧2))𝑇 
 
The dimension for both 𝒗 and 𝒈 is 𝑁 × 2, where 𝑁 = 2𝐼. Equations (82) and (83) are 
approximated at each point on the grids using an “upwind” scheme to approximate the partial 
derivatives as in Appendix I. Then, the approximated steady state collapses into the following 
set of equations: 
 𝜌𝒗 = 𝐮(𝐯) + 𝐀(𝐯; 𝐩)𝐯       (89) 𝟎 = 𝑨(𝒗;𝒑)𝑻𝒈        (90) 𝒑 = 𝑭(𝒈)         (91) 
 
where 𝐮(𝐯) is a matrix of the maximized utility function over the grids, and matrix 𝐀(𝐯; 𝐩)v 
captures the remaining terms in (82), including the deposit rate and adjustment cost function 
as expressed by 𝑑 and 𝑚. Equation (90) is the discretized version of the KFE described in (83), 
and (91) describes the movement of prices 𝒑 = (𝑟𝑏, 𝑤)𝑇 as a function of aggregate capital and 
mortgage debt along the joint distribution 𝒈. Note that we can forget about the mortgage rate 
since it does not depend on the movement of capital, but is rather tied to the liquid rate by an 
exogenous parameter 𝛽. The steady state system is solvable because, in total, there are 4𝑁 + 2 
equations and 4𝑁 + 2 unknowns.  
 
Having approximated the steady state, it is now possible to linearize the discretized equilibrium 
conditions stated in (74) - (81). The discretized equilibrium can be fully described by the 
following system of equations, which consists of 4𝑁 + 3 stochastic differential equations in 4𝑁 + 3 unknowns: 
 𝜌𝒗𝒕 = 𝐮(𝐯𝐭) + 𝐀(𝐯𝐭; 𝐩𝐭)𝐯𝐭 + 1𝑑𝑡𝐸𝑡𝑑𝒗𝒕     (92) 𝑑𝒈𝒕𝑑𝑡 = 𝑨(𝒗𝒕; 𝒑𝒕)𝑻𝒈𝒕        (93) 𝑑𝑍𝑡 = −𝜂𝑍𝑡𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑑𝑊𝑡       (94) 𝒑𝒕 = 𝑭(𝒈𝒕; 𝑍𝑡)        (95) 
 
As an intermediate step, I shall rearrange the equations so that all time derivatives are aligned 
on the left. Take an expectation of the entire system, and note that the expectation of a Wiener 
process is equal to zero.  
 
     
 
Then, the first-order Taylor expansion is as follows: 
    (96) 
where ?̂?𝒕, ?̂?𝒕, 𝑍𝑡 , ?̂?𝒕 are expressions of the value function, distribution, aggregate productivity, 
and prices in terms of deviations from the steady state. Notice that the pricing equation is static, 
with zero expectation of derivative with respect to time, therefore allowing us to utilize the 
simplifying condition ?̂?𝑡 = 𝑩𝑝𝑔?̂?𝑡 + 𝑩𝑝𝑍𝑍𝑡 to substitute into (96). 
 
𝐸𝑡 [𝑑?̂?𝑡𝑑?̂?𝑡𝑑𝑍𝑡 ] = [
𝑩𝑣𝑣 𝑩𝑣𝑝𝑩𝑝𝑔 𝑩𝑣𝑝𝑩𝑝𝑍𝑩𝑔𝑣 𝑩𝑔𝑔 + 𝑩𝑔𝑝𝑩𝑝𝑔 𝑩𝑔𝑝𝑩𝑝𝑍0 0 −𝜂 ] [?̂?𝑡?̂?𝑡𝑍𝑡 ] 𝑑𝑡   (97) 
 
If the Blanchard-Kahn condition holds, the system can be solved as below: 
 ?̂?𝑡 = 𝑫𝑣𝑔?̂?𝑡 +𝑫𝑣𝑍𝑍𝑡        (98) 𝑑?̂?𝑡𝑑𝑡 = (𝑩𝑔𝑔 + 𝑩𝑔𝑝𝑩𝑝𝑔 +𝑩𝑔𝑣𝑫𝑣𝑔)?̂?𝑡 + (𝑩𝑔𝑝𝑩𝑝𝑍 +𝑩𝑔𝑣𝑫𝑣𝑍)𝑍𝑡  (99) 𝑑𝑍𝑡 = −𝜂𝑍𝑡𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑑𝑊𝑡       (100) ?̂?𝑡 = 𝑩𝑝𝑔?̂?𝑡 + 𝑩𝑝𝑍𝑍𝑡        (101) 
 
where 𝑫𝑣𝑔 and 𝑫𝑣𝑍 are defined in this context as household’s optimal policy rules under the 
effects of aggregate shocks. After observing the system given by (98) – (101), one can argue 
that the solution to the heterogeneous agent model is reduced to a structure similar to that of 
standard representative agent models such as the Real Business Cycle (RBC) model. This result 
is also significant in that it proves that the finite difference method can be applied to 
heterogeneous agent models with different structures of household assets.  
 
6. Preliminary Results: Household Consumption and Savings Behavior 
 
In this Section, I have aimed to discuss some preliminary results derived from experimental 
computation exercises performed on this framework. The reader should be noted that these 
results are not final, but are enough to demonstrate some behaviors of the households with rich 
heterogeneity. As this class of models is still relatively new, and although much progress is 
made in terms of computation of household decisions, it still poses a challenge in terms of 
computation of a general equilibrium under the given settings.  
 
For this exercise, I take the block of the model which features household decisions to analyze 
the optimal consumption, savings and debt accumulation decisions of households. As described 
in Subsection 3.2.1, the HJB equation and KFE are set up. Then, following the same solution 
method, the first order conditions were derived according to (22) - (27). The finite difference 
method was used to approximate the partial derivatives of the value function and the joint 
distribution (Please refer to Appendix I for more details on the upwind finite difference scheme 
used for this problem). 
 
As we can see from the results of this exercise, idiosyncratic labor productivity plays a 
significant role in determining the consumption and savings decisions of households. In Figure 
1, we observe consumption-smoothing behavior in both cases. However, household 
consumption rises much faster as liquid wealth increases. Interestingly, there are some 
households who have zero liquid wealth and are highly indebted (i.e., “hand-to-mouth wealthy 
households” who own a house but are cash-constrained) maintain a low level of consumption 
throughout in both states. This reflects that when hit by an aggregate shock, the consumption 
response of the majority of these households will be higher in magnitude. It is also worthy to 
note that consumption at highest levels of wealth and indebtedness is identical across both 
states of the economy, implying the insignificance of idiosyncratic shocks on wealthy 
households. The idiosyncratic shock only comes into play when households are liquidity 
constrained. 
 
Figure 1: Households’ consumption in low and high types 
 
Figure 2 plots the optimal liquid savings policies of households under the current settings. We 
can observe that there is rich heterogeneity across households in terms of savings. Household 
savings in liquid assets increases with the amount of mortgage debt. This result is viable in the 
sense that those who have higher income or liquid wealth stock will be able to get larger 
amounts of subsidized loans. Aside from the rich heterogeneity in savings behavior, the shape 
of the savings policy function is consistent with that of heterogeneous agent models with a one-
asset structure, with higher savings incentives at the borrowing constraint for the low 
productivity economy due to precautionary savings motives.  
 
 






In this paper, I have introduced and solved a heterogeneous agent model with liquid wealth and 
mortgage debt in a New Keynesian framework. Through the solution procedure, I have proven 
that the general equilibrium for this type of model cannot be solved using standard analytical 
methods. Therefore, I propose the finite difference upwind scheme method, and apply it for the 
treatment of this model. This solution method is effective and robust, and can be used to solve 
a wide range of heterogeneous agent models.  
 
Furthermore, this model was structured in a way that can be a useful starting point for studying 
aspects of the economy related to heterogeneities in household income, wealth and asset 
structure, and how they can affect the aggregate economy, and vice versa. Additionally, and 
more specifically, the proposed model can be used for further studies on the effects of 
(subsidized or not) mortgage loans on a wide range of macroeconomic variables.  
 
From the experimental exercise, we observe that consumption smoothing and precautionary 
savings motives still persist in this setting, albeit at a lower level. Heterogeneity in savings 
behavior is high in both states of the economy. We also observe that the effect of idiosyncratic 
shock is significant for cash-constrained households.  
 
A key limitation of this model is the lack of standardized computational solution methods, 
especially those associated with connecting household heterogeneity with the rest of the 
economy. Further research in this area is much needed and anticipated to open up an extensive 
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APPENDIX I  
 
Finite Difference Method 
 
The upwind finite difference scheme is used to solve the HJB equation. I split the drift of 𝑏, 𝑤𝑧𝑘 + 𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝑑 − 𝜅(𝑑,𝑚) − 𝑐 into two parts: 𝑠𝑐 = 𝑤𝑧𝑘 − ?̃? + 𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝑐 and 𝑠𝑑 = −𝑑 −𝜅(𝑑,𝑚), and use the upwind scheme on them separately. 
 
To start the discretization procedure, denote grid points 𝑏𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐼, 𝑚𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝐽, 𝑧𝑘 , 𝑘 =1,… ,𝐾. Thus, we have: 𝑉𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 = 𝑉(𝑏𝑖 , 𝑚𝑗 , 𝑧𝑘) 
 
Denote ∆𝑏𝑖+ = 𝑏𝑖+1 − 𝑏𝑖  and ∆𝑏𝑖− = 𝑏𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖−1 and so on, and approximate derivatives for 𝑏 
and 𝑚 with either a forward or a backward difference approximation: 
 𝑉𝑏(𝑏𝑖 , 𝑚𝑗 , 𝑧𝑘) ≈ 𝑉𝑏,𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝐹 = 𝑉𝑖+1,𝑗,𝑘 − 𝑉𝑖,𝑗,𝑘∆𝑏𝑖+  
 𝑉𝑏(𝑏𝑖 , 𝑚𝑗 , 𝑧𝑘) ≈ 𝑉𝑏,𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝐵 = 𝑉𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 − 𝑉𝑖−1,𝑗,𝑘∆𝑏𝑖−  
 
Repeat the same process for 𝑉𝑚, and derive the discretized version of the HJB equation. 
 𝑉𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑛+1 − 𝑉𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑛∆ + 𝜌𝑉𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑛+1= 𝑢(𝑐𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑛 ) + 𝑉𝑏,𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑛+1 𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑏,𝑛 + 𝑉𝑚,𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑛+1 (−𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑗 − 𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑛 )+ ∑ 𝜆𝑘,𝑘′(𝑉𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑛+1 − 𝑉𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑛+1)𝐾𝑘′≠𝑘  
(102) 
 𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑛 = 𝑤𝑧𝑘 − ?̃? + 𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑖 − 𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑛 − 𝜅(𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑛 ,𝑚𝑗) − 𝑐𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑛    (103) 
 𝑢′(𝑐𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑛 ) = 𝑉𝑏,𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑛         (104) 
𝑉𝑏,𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑛 (−1− 𝜅𝑑(𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑛 ,𝑚𝑗)) = 𝑉𝑚,𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑛      (105) 
 
The choice of backward or forward difference is decided by the following “rule”: use a forward 
difference whenever the drift of a state variable is positive, and vice versa. Now define: 
 𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑐,𝐵 = 𝑤𝑧𝑘 − ?̃? + 𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝐵,𝑛        𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑐,𝐹 = 𝑤𝑧𝑘 − ?̃? + 𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝐹,𝑛        
 
where 𝑐𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝐵,𝑛  is optimal consumption decision implicitly calculated using backward difference 
of 𝑏𝑖, and 𝑐𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝐹,𝑛  is optimal consumption decision calculated using forward difference of 𝑏𝑖. 
 
Now, the following approximation must be carried out: 
 𝑉(𝑏𝑖 , 𝑚𝑗 , 𝑧𝑘)𝑠𝑐((𝑏𝑖 , 𝑚𝑗 , 𝑧𝑘) ≈ 𝑉𝑏,𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝐵,𝑛+1(𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑐,𝐵 )− + 𝑉𝑏,𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝐹,𝑛+1(𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑐,𝐹 )+ 
 
Define 𝑑𝑖.𝑗.𝑘𝐵𝐵 , 𝑑𝑖.𝑗.𝑘𝐵𝐹 , 𝑑𝑖.𝑗.𝑘𝐹𝐵 , 𝑑𝑖.𝑗.𝑘𝐹𝐹  as optimal repayments calculated using the forward/backward 
difference approximation with respect to 𝑏, 𝑉𝑏,𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝐹/𝐵 , and the forward/backward difference 
approximation with respect to 𝑚, 𝑉𝑚,𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝐹/𝐵 .  
 
Furthermore, substituting these definitions into the overall drifts of 𝑑 and 𝑠, we get: 
 𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝐵 = (𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝐵𝐹 )+ + (𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝐵𝐵 )−       (106) 𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝐹 = (𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝐹𝐹 )+ + (𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝐹𝐵 )−       (107) 𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑑,𝐵 = −𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝐵,𝑛 − 𝜅(𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝐵,𝑛 ,𝑚𝑗)      (108) 𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑑,𝐹 = −𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝐹,𝑛 − 𝜅(𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝐹,𝑛 ,𝑚𝑗)      (109) 𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 = 𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝐵 𝟏{𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑘<0}𝑑,𝐵 + 𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝐹 𝟏{𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑘>0}𝑑,𝐵      (110) 
 
Substitute equations (106) – (110) into the HJB equation to obtain: 
 
𝑉𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑛+1 − 𝑉𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑛∆ + 𝜌𝑉𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑛+1= 𝑢(𝑐𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑛 ) + 𝑉𝑏,𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝐵,𝑛+1(𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑐,𝐵 )− + 𝑉𝑏,𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝐹,𝑛+1(𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑐,𝐹 )+ + 𝑉𝑏,𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝐵,𝑛+1(𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑑,𝐵 )−+ 𝑉𝑏,𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝐹,𝑛+1(𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑑,𝐹 )+ + 𝑉𝑚,𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝐵,𝑛+1𝑑,𝑖,𝑗,𝑘− + 𝑉𝑚,𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝐵,𝑛+1(−𝑑,𝑖,𝑗,𝑘+ − 𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑗)+ ∑ 𝜆𝑘,𝑘′((𝑉𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑛+1 − 𝑉𝑖,𝑗,𝑘𝑛+1)𝐾𝑘′≠𝑘  
           (111) 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
